Constitutional Law - Privileged Communications - Effect of the Press Upon Grand Jury Investigations. Caldwell v. United States. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) by Holmes, Robert A.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 3 Article 13
Constitutional Law - Privileged Communications -
Effect of the Press Upon Grand Jury Investigations.
Caldwell v. United States. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.
1970)
Robert A. Holmes
Copyright c 1971 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Robert A. Holmes, Constitutional Law - Privileged Communications - Effect of the Press Upon Grand
Jury Investigations. Caldwell v. United States. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
687 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/13
CURRENT DECISIONS
in a rape case was found to be cruel and unusual punishment within the
scope of the eighth amendment. By applying a test which encompasses
"contemporary human knowledge," the court suggests a widening of
the scope of the amendment, and provides a clear constitutional basis
upon which similar cases can be determined.2
JEFFREY L. MusMAN
Constitutional Law-PRIvILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-EFFECT OF
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UPON GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS. Caldwell
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter who specializes in re-
porting the activities of the Black Panthers, was subpoenaed by a grand
jury to testify about his confidential interviews with Panther leaders.1
Claiming that compliance with the subpoena would infringe upon the
right of freedom of the press, Caldwell moved alternatively to quash
the subpoena and to limit the scope of the investigation.2
The district court, although refusing to quash the subpoena, became
the first court to hold that the first amendment protects a newsman
from disclosing confidential information unless a compelling and over-
riding need for the information is clearly established.3 Caldwell, how-
ever, claimed that the ruling did not adequately protect his first
amendment right to gather news because his tenuous relationship with
the Panthers would be destroyed merely by requiring him to appear at
the investigation. Accordingly, he refused to appear and was held in
contempt.4 On appeal of the contempt citation, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit expanded upon the district court's decision by
holding that Caldwell is not required to appear at the investigation until
the party seeking disclosure establishes a compelling need for his
presence.5
Whenever a court orders a newsman to disclose confidential informa-
28. For a discussion of possible applications of such a test see Goldberg, Declaring
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1970).
1. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 359 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
2. Id. at 360. The rationale underlying these motions was that Caldwell's consti-
tutional right to gather and disseminate news would be violated by requiring his
presence or by requiring him to disclose confidential information at the investigation
because either requirement would destroy the sensitive relationship between Caldwell
and the Panthers. Id. at 361.
3. Id. at 360, 362.
4. Caldwell v. United States, 431 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. Id. at 1089.
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tion that was acquired in his news gathering capacity, he is placed in
a dilemma. If he refuses to testify, the court may fine or imprison him
for contempt; if he testifies, his confidential informants may lose trust
in him and terminate their relationship.6 Therefore, attempts have been
made to persuade the courts and legislatures to grant a privilege to refuse
such disclosure.
Although many legislatures have rejected this plea, those of seven-
teen states have enacted laws granting a limited privilege.' Newsmen
maintain, however, that these statutes are of little assistance since they
generally protect only the identities of confidential informants, not
confidential information.8  Therefore, broader protection has been
sought in the courts.
Over the years, in their appeal to the courts, newsmen have argued
that their profession deserves a broad privilege for the same reasons that
other professions enjoy privileged communications. When a court
compells the disclosure of information, it has been urged, the newsman
is thereby forced to breach his professional code of ethics,10 break his
employer's regulations" or risk the possibility of economic reprisal.'
2
The courts, however, have rejected these contentions because of a belief
that the duty to testify is an essential element of the administration of
justice.' 3 An exception would be justified only if a superior public
6. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for New.smen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 18, 18-20 (1969).
7. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.190 (Supp. 1970); Aiuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070
(West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-4 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965);
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-601-1, -2 (1964);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970); Ch.
615, [1970] N.Y. ACTS 1357 (McKinney); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Supp. 1969);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1970). Nevada has recently enacted a similar
statute. 39 U.SJ.W. 2111 (Aug. 25, 1970).
8. Only the statutes of Michigan and New York are broad enough to protect the
content of confidential interviews as well as confidential identities.
9. E.g., People v. Sheriff of N. Y. County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). The
existing professional privileges are those of attorney-client, physician-patient, priest-
penitent, accountant-client, and police-informant. R. WEINBERG, CoNFIDENIAL AND
OTHER PmvMaEGE CoMM r IcAIoNs (1967).
10. E.g., Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 1950).
11. E.g., People v. Fancher, 2 Hun 226 (N.Y. 1874).
12. E.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 81, 70 S.E. 781, 786 (1911).
13. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919):
[1It is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance
upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every
person ... is bound to perform upon being properly summoned.... The
[Vol. 12:676
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policy were demonstrated,14 which the newsmen failed to accomplish.
In an attempt to overcome the deficiencies of past arguments, one
based upon the first amendment was developed: compelling newsmen
to disclose confidential information constitutes an incursion upon the
right to gather and disseminate news, and to the public's right to receive
news, in violation of the first amendment. Compulsory disclosure in-
hibits the ability to gather and to disseminate news by driving a wedge
of distrust between newsmen and their sources of confidential informa-
don, which in turn results in the destruction of these relationships.
Within the last twelve years, however, the highest courts of Colorado,'r
Hawaii,' -6 Oregon,' and Pennsylvania,18 as well as the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 9 have rejected this argument.
The courts have reiterated the belief that, although a citizen's duty
to testify is not absolute, the courts should be reluctant to admit an
exception which might lead to the obstruction of justice. The advocates
of the privilege believe that the analyses of these courts reflect an un-
reasonable and "inherited prejudice" against a newsman's privilege of
refusing to testify.2 ° Although the first amendment is intended to
enjoy the widest scope possible in a free society,2' the courts have held
that it is not broad enough to permit newsmen to refuse to testify.
22
The unaccepted countervailing argument is that because the first
amendment protects the functions of publishing and disseminating
news,23 it must of necessity protect the function of news gathering or
the former is of limited value.24 Finally, courts have hypothesized that
personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the
individual to the welfare of the public. The duty, so onerous at times, yet
so necessary to the administration of justice . . . is subject to mitigation in
exceptional circumstances....
14. The courts regard exceptions to these duties as obstructions to justice, and
therefore, they grant exceptions rarely, if at all, and only on the basis of sound public
policy. 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENcat § 2192 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
15. Murphy v. Colorado, - Colo. -, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). The Colorado
Supreme Court has never reported this decision. For the facts and holding of the case
see Guest & Stanzler, supra note 6, at 22.
16. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
17. State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
18. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
19. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
20. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 6, at 19, 26.
21. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
22. E.g., In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
23. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
24. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 6, at 31; In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d
679, 689 (1956) (Musmano, J., dissenting): "Freedom of the press means freedom to
19711
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if the first amendment does permit newsmen to refuse to testify, the
interest of the public in compelling testimony is clearly superior to such
right.2 5 Newsmen have countered by stating that these courts have only
superficially considered the public interest involved and have failed to
inquire into the realities of each case.26 And, perhaps more importantly,
these opinions fail to reflect the Supreme Court's great reluctance in
permitting any limitation of first amendment freedoms.2 7
Caldwell v. United States represents a complete departure from prior
law. It is the only holding that the first amendment is broad enough
to permit newsmen to refuse to testify if such testimony would inhibit
their ability to gather news and to inform the public. 2  Caldwell places
upon the litigant seeking disclosure the formidable burdens of establish-
ing that his interest in disclosure is clearly more compelling than the
first amendment rights at stake, and that his need for disclosure can
only be served by compulsory testimony.29 Finally, the decision recog-
nizes that permitting newsmen to refuse to divulge confidential infor-
mation may not adequately safeguard the first amendment rights in-
volved in every case. It may be necessary, in addition, to permit a
newsman to refuse even to appear."
The real importance of the Caldwell decision is that it represents
a compromise between the judiciary's need for the best available evi-
dence and the newsman's need for autonomy in gathering news. The
judicial function of administering justice is not unduly hampered be-
cause the privilege can be defeated by establishing a compelling need
for disclosure which cannot alternatively be served. The newsman's
functions of gathering and disseminating news are protected, at least
until this burden is met. On this basis the decision indicates the initiation
gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate it. When any one of these integral opera-
tions is interdicted, freedom of the press becomes a river without water."
25. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 330, 367 P.2d 472, 480 (1961).
26. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 6, at 19, 37-38.
27. See id. at 19, 30-31. The Supreme Court has permitted restraints on freedom of
expression only after a "clear and present danger" has been established. Schenk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Rather than restrain freedom of expression, it has
permitted the unmalicious defamation of public figures and officials. Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Rather than infringe upon the religious liberty granted by the first amendment, the
Court has prohibited school prayers. School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
28. 434 F.2d at 1086.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1089.
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of a trend that may culminate in the widespread judicial recognition
of this long-sought privilege.31 At the very least, Caldwell represents
a check upon the increasing practice of "convert[ing] news gatherers
into Department of Justice investigators. ... 32
ROBERT A. HOLMES
Constitutional Law-PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL.
United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
A California couple placed a notice in a magazine announcing their
desire to hear from "other photo-collectors and liberal-minded couples."
Defendant Dellapia responded and correspondence, including an ex-
change of obscene films, ensued. One of the packages of film mailed
by Dellapia at the request of the couple was intercepted by postal in-
spectors. Dellapia was subsequently arrested by federal authorities and
convicted for sending obscene matter through the mail in violation of
the Comstock Act.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
conviction, ruling that where there is no public distribution and when
children are not involved the government cannot constitutionally prose-
cute an individual for mailing obscene material to adults who have re-
quested it.2 The court concluded that the right to possess and receive
obscene matter established in Stanley v. Georgia3 would be mean-
31. Two cases dealing with this issue have recently been decided. In State v. Knops,
- Wis. -, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971), the court adopted the compelling need test as
enunciated in Caldwell, but found that a compelling need for the newsmen's testimony
did exist. In In re Pappas, - Mass. -, 266 NE.2d 297 (1971), the court criticized and re-
jected the Caldwell test stating that such a privilege seriously interferes with law en-
forcement.
32. 434 F.2d at 1086.
1. The Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), declares in part that "[elvery ob-
scene ... article, matter, thing, device, or substance ... is declared to be non-mailable.
• .." It provides that "[w]hoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing . .. of
[non-mailable matter] ...shall be fined ...or ... imprisoned ...or both. .. :
See also, 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964). For commentary on a Supreme Court decision bearing
on the limitations of the Comstock Act see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 562 n.7
(1969). Cf. United States v. Book Bin, 39 U.SL.W. 4120 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1971); Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506-08 (1903); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877).
2. United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See generally 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 261 (1969). During a
search of Stanley's home three rolls of obscene film were found. The Supreme Court of
Georgia upheld Stanley's conviction for violation of a Georgia obscenity statute, GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968), repealed, [1968] Ga. Acts 1249, 1346. Stanley v.
State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968). In reversing, on appeal, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that ". . . mere private possession of obscene matter cannot con-
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